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pAbstract
This paper examines gender differentials in earnings in Macedonia, with special
emphasis on the role of occupational segregation. The lower earnings of women in
Macedonia cannot be explained by gender differences in measured human capital
endowments. There is a high degree of segregation of jobs along gender lines, the
end product of which is lower earnings for women relative to men. Women are
over-represented in female-dominated occupations, and feminization of occupations
has a negative impact on earnings. Even after controlling for numerous individual
and job characteristics and gender composition of occupations, a huge amount of
the gender wage gap remains unexplained.
JEL codes: J31, P2
Keywords: Occupational segregation; Occupational feminization; Gender wage gap;
Decomposition of earnings differentials
1 Introduction
Gender differentials in the labor market in industrial and transition countries have
attracted much attention from researchers, policy makers and international institu-
tions1. Despite long-standing legislation on equal pay and equal opportunities, a wage
gap between women and men persists in the United States and Europe. In the United
States, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the women-to-men median earn-
ings ratio was about 74 in 2000 and has risen to 81 percent in 2010. In the EU-25
countries, according to national data sources, the average gender pay gap among em-
ployees was fairly stable at around 15-17 percent during 1994-2006, but there was a
large variability among member states. The pay gap in Italy and Portugal was in the
single digits while the pay gap in Cyprus, Estonia, Germany, Slovakia, and the United
Kingdom was in excess of 20 percent throughout2. A typical finding for all countries is
that the gender pay gap is not fully explained by differences in individual human cap-
ital endowments and other conventional determinants of earnings such as job charac-
teristics and firm characteristics. In fact, many studies find that the unexplained pay
gap is considerably larger than the gap attributable to gender differences in individual,
job, and firm characteristics.
One hypothesis receiving increasing attention is the effect of occupational segrega-
tion on earnings. Anker (1997) notes that the crowding of women in a smaller number
of occupations than men is common in labor markets across the world and is an im-
portant source of gender-based inequalities. However, studies that examine theBanerjee; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
icense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
rovided the original work is properly cited.
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are still relatively small compared to the voluminous literature on the determinants of
the gender pay gap. For example, only four out of the thirty five studies surveyed in the
European Commission (2003) staff paper include a variable on gender segregation or
gender share in occupation in the earnings function equations and decomposition of
the gender pay gap. Also, country-specific earnings functions reported in European
Commission (2005) do not include any gender share in occupation variable.
Notable econometric studies on the role and contribution of gender share in occupa-
tion on earnings include Bayard et al. (2003), Boraas and Rodgers III (2003), Johnson
and Solon (1986), Kilbourne et al. (1994), Macpherson and Hirsch (1995), and Sorensen
(1990) for the United States; Busch and Holst (2011) for Germany; Campos and Ropero
(2011) for Spain; European Commission (2002) for a pooled sample of EU-12 countries;
Jurajda (2003) for the Czech and Slovak Republics; Karamessini and Ioakimoglou
(2007) for Greece; and Ogloblin (1999) for Russia. These studies confirm that earnings
of both women and men are lower in female-dominated occupations. While a majority
of the studies show that the negative effect of working in female-dominated occupa-
tions on earnings is much more pronounced for women, studies by Johnson and Salon
(1986) and Sorensen (1990) for the United States and Busch and Holst (2011) for
Germany found that the negative effect was stronger for men. In Macpherson and
Hirsch’s (1995) study for the United States, the effect of gender composition on earn-
ings was of similar magnitude for women and men. The fraction of the observed gen-
der pay gap explained by occupational segregation varies a lot across studies and
countries. The gender share in occupation variable explained between 7 percent and
32 percent of the observed pay gap in the studies on the United States, about 25 percent
in the cross-country study on EU-12 countries (European Commission 2002), as much
as 50-56 percent in Greece (Karamessini and Ioakimoglu 2007), and as little as 3 per-
cent in Germany (Busch and Holst 2011).
A variety of explanations have been offered in the literature for the prevalence of oc-
cupational segregation. Key factors include: choice of field of study which results in seg-
regation in education and eventually in employment; preference of women for jobs that
allow flexible hours or intermittent employment; differences in unmeasured worker
skills or job characteristics that may be correlated with gender; stereotyping of occupa-
tions as appropriate for women owing to discriminatory hiring practices or social
norms; and covert barriers to entry and bias in organizational practices (see European
Commission 2009). Karamessini and Ioakimoglu (2007) emphasize that the extent to which
gender-based occupational segregation occurs depends on prevailing institutions, culture,
and history. They contend that gender relations are impacted by wage-setting and collect-
ive bargaining practices and that these practices reflect “not only current processes but also
the weight of history” (p. 35). In a similar vein, Ogloblin (1999) and Jurajda (2003) conclude
that occupational segregation by gender in labor markets of transition countries is more
likely a legacy from communism under which central planners stereotyped women into
particular jobs and consequently shaped social attitudes. Pailhé (2000) also argues that
stereotyping is widely accepted as a part of life by Central European women.
In this paper we examine gender differentials in earnings in the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia in 2000, with special emphasis on the role of occupational seg-
regation. In particular, we estimate the importance of the degree of feminization of an
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ings gap. The choice of the reference period is dictated by data accessibility. Despite
the vintage of the data, the findings should serve as a useful comparison point for fu-
ture research. Macedonia is relatively under-researched on the gender pay gap issue.
No official data exists on the gender pay gap. Earlier econometric analyses of the gen-
der wage gap in Macedonia include Angel-Urdinola (2008) and Lehman (2010) for
Macedonia based on data for 2006 and 2007, respectively. However, neither of these
studies examines the role of occupational segregation and gender concentration in oc-
cupation in explaining earnings and the gender wage gap. Interest on gender equality
issues in Macedonia is expected to rise following the recent launch of the “Equality
Pays Off” initiative by the EU aimed at providing information and promoting awareness
on gender equality, including the gender pay gap. The initiative covers the EU-27 mem-
ber states and seven other countries, including Macedonia3.
We approach the empirical analysis in two ways. First, we follow the traditional ap-
proach. We estimate gender-specific earnings functions for all wage and salaried workers
corrected for sample selection bias. The explanatory variables include the traditional vari-
ables mentioned in the literature on gender pay gaps (e.g., individual characteristics such
as education and work experience, and job characteristics such as occupation, industry,
and ownership and size of the firm where the worker is employed, etc.) plus a set of
dummy variables measuring the gender composition of occupations. Based on the earn-
ings functions estimates, the observed gender wage gap is divided into the part “explained”
by different personal and job characteristics, the “unexplained” part reflecting differences
in the wage structure (i.e., in the constant terms and coefficients of the regression equa-
tions for men and women), and the part due to selectivity correction.
Although the inclusion of occupation and other job characteristics as explanatory
variables in earnings functions is extremely common (recent examples are Christofides
and Michael 2013, and Pastore et al. 2013), it has been noted by many researchers that
this gives rise to endogeneity bias because job outcomes depend on the decisions of
workers and employers (see, for example, Beblo et al. 2003a, b). Thus, in the second
approach, we carry out an analysis of occupational attainment and estimate within-
occupation earnings functions to partially address the concern about endogeneity.
However, do not carry out a full decomposition of the observed overall gender pay gap
into within-occupation and between-occupation earnings differentials, in line with
Brown et al. (1980), because some occupation groups had a limited number of women.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background information
on the economy and labor market institutions. Section 3 describes the data on which this
paper is based. Section 4 looks at the sample characteristics. Section 5 presents the findings
of earnings function analysis for all wage earners. Based on these estimates, Section 6 de-
composes the observed gender wage gap into explained, unexplained, and selectivity bias
components. Section 7 examines the determinants of occupational attainment. Section 8
presents the results of within-occupation earnings functions. Section 9 concludes.
2 Economic and institutional background
Macedonia was buffeted by several shocks following independence: border closure and
trade embargo during 1994-1995 owing to a political dispute with Greece over the
name of the country; regional unrest in 1999 on account of the crisis in Kosovo; and
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As a result, business prospects and investment activity were undermined, foreign inves-
tors stayed away, and growth was lackluster. Thus, per capita GDP in purchasing-
power-parity dollars increased by only 16 percent during 1992-2000 to about 6,350 in
20004. The structural transformation of the economy proceeded slowly, enterprise re-
structuring was limited, and corporate governance stayed weak. The enterprise sector
as a whole continued to generate losses and there was little new job creation. The leg-
acy of high unemployment from pre-independence remained intact at more than 30
percent for both women and men. The share of employment in agriculture and in the
informal economy increased during the transition to a market economy.
Some institutional aspects contributed to the low demand for labor. In particular, the
structure of the social insurance system discouraged the hiring of part-time workers. A
floor for social contributions, set at 65 percent of the average sectoral wage for full-time
work, increased the effective payroll tax for part-time workers. Generous maternity leave
regulations and the right to return to the former work in the enterprise also inhibited
women from early return to work on part-time basis (Cazes and Nesporova 2006).
However, a few features of the labor market were not particularly restrictive. Al-
though the Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) index in 2000 was estimated at
3.3 (Micevska 2008), it appears that enterprise managers did not see labor regulations
as a major constraint on firm growth. In the Business Environment and Economic
Performance Survey conducted by the World Bank and the European Bank for Recon-
struction and Development in 2002, the average rating of labor regulations as a con-
straint on firm growth was 1.68 in Macedonia (i.e. between “no obstacle” and “minor
obstacle)5. According to the World Bank’s assessment on doing business, the rigidity of
the labor regulation index in Macedonia with respect to hiring, firing, and working
conditions was below the average for the region. The unionization rate and the bargain-
ing power of trade unions had fallen during the transition process. Around the refer-
ence period of this paper (2000), wages in the public sector and large private
enterprises were determined through collective bargaining at the sectoral level, while
wages in small and micro-firms were unilaterally fixed by employers on the basis of the
firm’s ability to pay. Mojsoska-Blazevski (2011) argues that, because of the nature of the
wage-setting mechanism and the preponderance of small and micro firms, legal cover-
age of wages in Macedonia was weak.
The Constitution of Macedonia proclaims gender equality and includes a general
provision against discrimination on several grounds, including gender. Macedonia
enacted a National Plan for Gender Equality in 1999 and introduced legislation on
equal pay and equal opportunities in 2006 (Koteska 2011).
3 Data
This paper is based on data collected in the September 2000 national labor force survey
in Macedonia. The labor force survey involved a stratified random sample of 7,200
households, representing about 1.5 percent of the total number of households in the
country. Two questionnaires were used in the survey. The first questionnaire obtained
information on the socio-demographic characteristics of all members of the household.
The second questionnaire targeted household members between 15 and 80 years of age
individually, and contained separate modules on employed person, those not currently
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formation from 20,904 persons, of whom 10,503 were men and 10,401 were women.
The survey data may be subject to bias. In the survey, only 59.4 percent of the per-
sons were questioned personally. Another member of the household provided the an-
swers for those who could not be questioned personally. A World Bank study (2003)
argues that although the labor force surveys in Macedonia meet International Labor
Office standards for design and conduct (including concepts and definitions), they tend
to overstate unemployment and downplay informal sector activity. Still, these surveys
remain the best source of labor market data.
4 Sample characteristics
Labor force participation in Macedonia follows the common cross-country pattern of
being higher among men than women. The participation rate in 2000 was about 65
percent for men and about 41 percent for women. The incidence of open unemploy-
ment was very high―around 31 percent―and the gender differential was small. Wage
employment was equally important among women and men. Among both sexes, 71
percent of those employed were employees. Paid self-employment was more prevalent
among men, but women were more likely than men to be engaged as unpaid family
workers.
The gender differential in earnings among wage employees in Macedonia in 2000 was
smaller than that observed in most EU-15 and transition countries. The ratio of earn-
ings of women to those of men was 0.85 for monthly earnings and 0.88 for hourly earn-
ings. In the EU-15 countries, the gender earnings ratios in 2000 were in the range
0.79‒0.94, and averaged 0.84. In transition countries, women-men earnings ratios were
typically around 0.80 (Newell and Reilley 2000). The observed (or unadjusted) gender
earnings gap can be partly attributed to differences between the two sexes in several
characteristics that are associated with earnings. Data on some selected characteristics
for wage employees only are reported below.
4.1 Personal characteristics
As Table 1 shows, women had an advantage with respect to educational attainment. A
higher proportion of women than men had studied beyond the secondary level. Women
employees were on average slightly younger and had less experience in the labor market
than men. A lower proportion of women than men were unmarried. The proportion of
ethnic Albanians among women employees was much smaller than that among men em-
ployees. This likely reflects the traditional views among ethnic Albanians that emphasize
women’s domestic responsibilities and discourage work outside the home.
4.2 Enterprise characteristics
The public sector was the largest employer in Macedonia, and women had a lower rep-
resentation than men in this sector. In the private sector, the likelihood of working in
enterprises with more than 25 workers was greater for women than for men.
4.3 Occupational segregation and gender concentration
Occupational segregation, measured at the one-digit ISCO classification level, among
wage employees was small (Table 2). The Duncan segregation index, which measures
Table 1 Macedonia: Mean values of selected sample personal and job characteristicsa
Men Women
Monthly earnings (denars)b 9183.61 7851.68
Hourly earnings (denars)b 54.87 48.36
Ln (hourly earnings) 8.9923 8.8567
Work hours per week 42.330 41.449
Education
Below primary 0.050 0.025
Primary 0.205 0.179
Secondary, 3 years 0.171 0.107
Secondary, 4 years 0.403 0.448
Non-university post-secondary 0.061 0.097
University and above 0.110 0.145







Ethnic Albanians 0.101 0.024
Other minorities 0.067 0.040
Enterprise ownership/size
Public sector 0.758 0.689
Private, with <10 employees 0.103 0.119
Private, with 10-25 employees 0.042 0.037
Private, with >25 employees 0.098 0.155
Pension fund registration
Registered 0.866 0.865
Not registered 0.134 0.135
Region
West Macedonia 0.185 0.157
East Macedonia 0.281 0.288





aFor categorical variables, shows fraction of total in the category.
bIn 2000, the period average exchange rate was 1 Euro = 60.7250 denars.
cMeasured as (age-years of education-6).
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equality to be attained in occupational distribution, was 0.214. A higher proportion of
women than men worked in white-collar occupations such as professionals, technicians
and associate professionals, and clerks. Whereas, men had a higher proportion working
as managers and as plant and machine operators. The gender differences in the
Table 2 Macedonia: Occupation and industry distribution by gender, 2000
Men Women
Occupation (in percent)
Managers and senior officials 3.9 1.9
Professionals 9.3 16.8
Technicians and associate professionals 9.5 13.2
Clerks 8.2 15.0
Service and sales workers 16.3 17.6
Craft and related trade workers 24.5 21.0
Plant and machine operators and assemblers 18.1 4.0
Elementary (unskilled) occupations 10.3 10.5
Total 100 100
Duncan segregation indexa 0.214
Industry (in percent)
Agriculture 8.3 3.9
Manufacturing and mining 31.0 37.9
Electricity, gas, water supply 5.5 1.8
Construction 10.6 1.9
Wholesale and retail trade 9.6 11.7
Hotels and restaurants 2.6 2.9
Transport and communications 7.5 2.2
Financial intermediation 0.9 2.8
Real estate and business services 2.5 1.8
Public administration 6.7 5.7
Education 5.1 9.9
Health and social work 3.4 13.2
Other services 6.2 4.3
Total 100 100
Duncan segregation indexa 0.257
aComputed as follows: Segregation index = 0.5*Sum[Abs(Pm−Pf)], where Pm and Pf are the proportion of men and
women, respectively, employed in a particular occupation or industry.
Source: Labor Force Survey, September 2000.
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occupations were small.
However, there was considerable gender segregation within the one-digit occupation
categories. Thus, another dimension of segregation is indicated by the degree of concentra-
tion in a limited number of occupations classified at the ISCO-88 three-digit level. Similar
to that observed in other countries (European Commission 2009), women in Macedonia
were crowded in a smaller number of occupations than men. However, the degree of
concentration was higher than that observed in the European Union as a whole. In
Macedonia, about 50 percent of women employees were found in a total of six three-digit
level occupations, whereas the top six occupations for men accounted for only 32 percent
of men employees (Table 3). In contrast, in the European Union, the top six occupations
accounted for 36 percent of women and 25 percent of men in work in 2005 (European
Commission 2009, p. 31).
Table 3 Macedonia: Occupation crowding by gender, 2000
Men employees








Motor vehicle drivers 832 8.6 98.6
Protective services workers 516 6.4 96.4
Machinery mechanics and fitters 723 4.9 99.4
Building frame and related trade workers 712 4.5 99.3
Shop salespersons 522 4.4 40.2
Metal molders, sheet-metal workers and
related trades
721 3.5 95.9
Administrative associate professionals 343 3.3 53.4
Material recording and transport clerks 413 3.1 86.6
Assemblers 828 2.7 95.7
Building finishers and related trade workers 713 2.6 98.9
Total: top 6 non-agricultural occupation
groups
32.2












Textile, garments and related trade
workers
743 17.3 88.8
Shop salespersons 522 10.1 59.8
Numerical clerks 412 7.5 81.1
Cleaners and launderers 913 5.9 76.2
Nursing professionals 323 5.0 97.3
Administrative associate professionals 343 4.5 46.6




Housekeeping and restaurant service
workers
512 3.2 44.5
Cashiers, tellers and related clerks 421 2.8 52.1
Total: top 6 non-agricultural occupation
groups
50.4
Total: top 10 non-agricultural occupation
groups
63.2
Source: Author’s calculations based on September 2000 Labor Force Survey data.
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gender concentration within each three-digit occupation group and the distribution of
occupation feminization among women and men. If wage employees in the sample were
assigned randomly to occupations, the segregation-free distribution would collapse around
the proportion of women employees in the whole sample―about 40 percent in the case of
Macedonia. However, as Table 4 shows, men tended to be employed in men-dominated
occupations while women tended to be employed in women-dominated occupations.
Table 4 Macedonia: Frequency distribution of occupation feminization of wage employees
by gender (in percent)
Percent of occupation femalea Men Women
≤ 10 46.1 1.8
> 10 – 20 9.5 2.8
> 20 – 30 8.3 4.4
> 30 – 40 10.5 8.0
> 40 – 50 7.7 10.2
> 50 – 60 11.0 22.7
> 60 – 70 2.1 6.4
> 70 – 80 2.0 9.9
> 80 – 90 2.9 28.0
> 90 – 100 0.1 5.7
Total 100 100
aOccupation classified at the ISCO-88 three-digit level.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on September 2000.
Labor Force Survey data.
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occupations where more than 40 percent of the employees were women.
Contrary to expectations, the distribution of occupation feminization was more skewed for
men than for women. The likelihood of men being found in overwhelmingly men-
dominated occupations was greater than that of women being found in overwhelmingly
women-dominated occupations. Slightly over one-half of men were employed in occupations
where more than 80 percent of employees were men, whereas only one-third of women were
employed in occupations where more than 80 percent of employees were women.4.4 Industrial segregation
Industrial segregation was lower in Macedonia than in industrial countries and some
transition countries. The Duncan segregation index for industry affiliation, measured at the
one-digit level, was around 0.257 in Macedonia (Table 2), compared with 0.291‒0.426
in industrial countries (Blau and Kahn 1996), 0.324 in Russia (Ogloblin 1999), and 0.33 in
Poland (Adamchik and Bedi 2003). Men had a higher representation than women in
construction and in transport and communications, while a higher proportion of women
than men were employed in manufacturing, the education sector, and the health sector.5 Earnings function analysis
Earnings functions are estimated for wage employees, for both sexes together and separately
for men and women. Since participation in wage employment is not a random
phenomenon, we first correct for potential sample selection bias by estimating an equation
to determine who is a wage employee and then estimate an earnings function conditional
on wage employment. Thus, we include in the earnings equation an additional regressor
representing the selectivity variable (inverse of Mill’s ratio) constructed from the estimates
of a multinomial logit model for activity status. The choice groups for activity status are
wage employment, non-wage employment (comprising employers, self-employed persons,
and unpaid family workers), unemployment, and non-participation in the labor force. In the
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requires having one or more variables that influence the choice of activity status but do not
directly determine earnings. We achieve this identification by excluding household charac-
teristics that appear in the model for activity status (viz., presence of small children, if head
of household, number of other earners in the household, and total earnings of other
household members) from the earnings equation. The results of the first stage exercise on
the determinants of activity status are not reported in the paper, but are available from the
author on request.
The dependent variable in the earnings equation is the natural logarithm of hourly
earnings. Hourly earnings were calculated from the answers given by the respondents to
questions on their usual monthly earnings and hours usually worked per week. The
explanatory variables include education, proxy for experience, marital status, ethnic
background, firm characteristics, if the individual was registered with the pension fund,
region of employment, urban residence, industry of operation of enterprise, occupation of
worker, and occupation feminization (measured as the ratio of women to total employment
in the employee’s occupation measured at the ISCO-88 three-digit level).
The estimated earnings functions are presented in Table 5. The estimated asymptotic
covariance matrix for the two-step multinomial logit sample selection model corrects for
heteroscedasticity induced by the selection. In the equation for both sexes, the coefficient
on the dummy variable for women is negative and significant at the 1 percent level: being a
woman reduces hourly earnings by 11.9 percent6. Earnings functions estimated separately
for men and women indicate that the wage determination process is different between
genders. We carried out the standard F tests of homogeneity of earnings equations for men
and women. We tested for (i) the equality of the coefficients of the gender specific
regressions; and (ii) the coefficients of the set of women interaction terms (i.e., the slope and
intercept dummies) in the pooled equation for both sexes being equal to zero. In both cases
the computed F value allows the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 99 percent
confidence level. The results of the earnings equation with slope and intercept dummies are
reported in Table 6.
The relationship between education and earnings is statistically significant and non-linear
for both sexes. The returns to education at almost all levels are higher for women than for
men: except for non-university post-secondary education, the coefficients on all the educa-
tion dummies are significantly higher for women. Completing secondary education appears
to be critical for men. Up to three years of secondary education, the incremental return
from an additional year of schooling, though significant, is small. There is a jump in the
incremental return upon completing four years of secondary education, and the earnings
differentials between successive stages of education beyond this level imply a constant
percentage increase in earnings from an additional year of education. In contrast, for
women, the returns from completing primary education and from obtaining a university
degree are substantial. In the interim education levels, the incremental return from an
additional year of education is steady.
The coefficients on experience are significant for both men and women, and the
regression equation for the pooled sample containing slope and intercept dummies
indicates that there is no significant difference between men and women with regard to
returns to experience. The experience-earnings profile is concave, peaking at between 23
and 29 years of experience. Münich et al. (2005) found an experience-earnings profile
Table 5 Macedonia: Determinants of hourly earnings with selectivity correction
Both sexes Men Women
Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard
errora errora errora
Constant 3.2636 0.1105*** 3.2741 0.1213*** 2.5948 0.2255***
Education dummiesb
Primary 0.1251 0.0348*** 0.0737 0.0398* 0.3123 0.0697***
Secondary, 3 years 0.2044 0.0408*** 0.1352 0.0444*** 0.4681 0.0856***
Secondary, 4 years 0.2976 0.0418*** 0.2414 0.0446*** 0.5325 0.0892***
Non-university post-secondary 0.4314 0.0509*** 0.4385 0.0572*** 0.5961 0.1038***
University and above 0.6814 0.0558*** 0.6568 0.0597*** 0.9129 0.1165***
Years of potential experience 0.0123 0.0047*** 0.0186 0.0056*** 0.0173 0.0080**
Experience-squared −0.0002 0.0001** −0.0004 0.0001*** −0.0003 0.0002*
Unmarried person dummy −0.0521 0.0209** −0.1179 0.0280*** 0.0359 0.0312
Enterprise dummiesc
Public sector −0.1462 0.0196*** −0.1827 0.0278*** −0.1073 0.0267***
Private, with <10 employees −0.2521 0.0258*** −0.2740 0.0353*** −0.2197 0.0371***
Private, with 10–25 employees −0.0307 0.0332 −0.0320 0.0442 −0.0546 0.0492
Pension fund registration dummy 0.1316 0.0186*** 0.1196 0.0250*** 0.1509 0.0267***
Industry dummiesd
Manufacturing 0.1029 0.0276*** 0.0944 0.0329*** 0.1581 0.0530***
Electricity, gas, water supply 0.4279 0.0379*** 0.4410 0.0438*** 0.3189 0.0795***
Construction 0.1694 0.0334*** 0.1446 0.0384*** 0.0721 0.0785
Wholesale and retail trade 0.1679 0.0338*** 0.1163 0.0421*** 0.2629 0.0592***
Hotels and restaurants 0.2383 0.0454*** 0.1111 0.0600* 0.4327 0.0719***
Transport and communications 0.2108 0.0357*** 0.1712 0.0414*** 0.3799 0.0757***
Financial intermediation 0.6299 0.0530*** 0.6322 0.0882*** 0.6328 0.0722***
Real estate and business services 0.1590 0.0459*** 0.0743 0.0564 0.3092 0.0804***
Public administration 0.2543 0.0355*** 0.2764 0.0444*** 0.2177 0.0623***
Education 0.1262 0.0368*** 0.0909 0.0499* 0.1794 0.0603***
Health and social work 0.2162 0.0353*** 0.1858 0.0529*** 0.2224 0.0581***
Other services 0.2519 0.0354*** 0.2347 0.0430*** 0.3101 0.0639***
Occupation dummiese
Managers and senior officials 0.2627 0.0416*** 0.2844 0.0513*** 0.2222 0.0749***
Professionals 0.2341 0.0340*** 0.1863 0.0466*** 0.2921 0.0494***
Technicians and associate
professionals
0.2181 0.0295*** 0.1711 0.0393*** 0.2788 0.0452***
Clerks 0.1519 0.0300*** 0.1046 0.0408** 0.1997 0.0447***
Service and sales workers 0.0493 0.0273* 0.0642 0.0360* 0.0171 0.0413
Craft and related trade workers 0.0657 0.0268** 0.0970 0.0340*** 0.0090 0.0444
Plant and machine operators
and assemblers
0.0446 0.0283 0.0629 0.0351* −0.0162 0.0536
Occupation feminization dummiesf
Feminization 21-40 percent −0.0856 0.0203*** −0.0590 0.0245** −0.0588 0.0477
Feminization 41–60 percent −0.0933 0.0209*** −0.0586 0.0268** −0.0622 0.0458
Feminization 61–80 percent −0.1809 0.0263*** −0.1833 0.0419*** −0.1088 0.0482**
Feminization >80 percent −0.1710 0.0239*** −0.2265 0.0475*** −0.0999 0.0460**
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Table 5 Macedonia: Determinants of hourly earnings with selectivity correction
(Continued)
Ethnic affiliation dummiesg
Ethnic Albanians −0.0407 0.0333 −0.0698 0.0349** −0.1745 0.0817**
Other minorities −0.0254 0.0296 −0.0600 0.0351* −0.0455 0.0539
Region dummiesh
West Macedonia −0.0926 0.0182*** −0.1111 0.0243*** −0.0614 0.0284**
East Macedonia −0.2123 0.0159*** −0.2502 0.0219*** −0.1647 0.0229***
Central Macedonia −0.1329 0.0170*** −0.1476 0.0228*** −0.1199 0.0243***
Urban area dummy 0.0430 0.0157*** 0.0237 0.0192 0.1112 0.0243***
Selection term (LAMBDA) 0.1165 0.0437*** 0.2126 0.0519*** 0.1583 0.0718**
Female dummy −0.1265 0.0183***
R-squared 0.3533 0.3078 0.4465
Adjusted R-squared 0.3482 0.2989 0.4353
F-ratio 68.51 34.54 40.10
(N) 5436 3305 2131
aStandard error corrected for heteroscedasticity induced by the selection. The two-step sample selection model was
estimated using LIMDEP.
bThe omitted category is below primary education.
cThe omitted category is private enterprises with more than 25 workers.
dThe omitted category is agriculture.
eThe omitted category is elementary (unskilled) occupations.
fThe omitted category is feminization of 20 percent or less.
gThe omitted category is ethnic Macedonian.
hThe omitted category is Skopje region.
***significant at the 1 percent level; **significant at the 5 percent level; *significant at the 10 percent level.
Banerjee IZA Journal of European Labor Studies Page 12 of 272014, 3:4
http://www.izajoels.com/content/3/1/4peaking at around 26 years of experience for the Czech Republic, while Ogloblin (2000)
found a profile peaking at around 17 to 19 years for Russia. The finding of similar age-
earnings profile for both sexes is contrary to expectations. Normally, it is expected that
women will have a flatter age earnings profile because of the likelihood of women interrupt-
ing their work experience on account of child bearing or because they may prefer to be
engaged in activities which give them flexibility to take time off to look after family matters.
Marital status has a significant effect on earnings of men but not of women. Unmarried
men earn less than their married counterparts by 11.1 percent. Several other studies have
found a similar result (e.g., Sorensen (1990) for the United States, and Adamchik and Bedi
(2003) for Poland). The common explanations are that married men have greater attachment
to the labor market because of their family obligations, and that marriage is a proxy for
unmeasured attributes of productivity. The insignificant coefficient of marital status for
women suggests that for women marriage is not associated with greater attachment to the
labor market.
The effect of ethnicity on earnings is judged to be weak. On one hand, the coefficient on
ethnic Albanians is negative and statistically significant in the separate equations for both
men and women and the gender difference between the coefficients is seemingly large. On
the other hand, the coefficients on ethnic affiliation are not significant in the pooled
equation for both sexes, and the regression equation with interaction dummies suggests that
there is no significant difference between men and women on the effect of ethnicity on
earnings. These results along with the findings from the first-stage multinomial logit model




Coefficient Standard errorb Coefficient Standard errorb
Constant 3.3824 0.1216*** −0.6705 0.1196***
Education dummiesc
Primary 0.0809 0.0394** 0.2024 0.0775***
Secondary, 3 years 0.1408 0.0454*** 0.2796 0.0845***
Secondary, 4 years 0.2445 0.0462*** 0.2352 0.0826***
Non-university post-secondary 0.4375 0.0583*** 0.0975 0.0954
University and above 0.6477 0.0616*** 0.1989 0.0974**
Years of potential experience 0.0123 0.0053** 0.0022 0.0049
Experience-squared −0.0002 0.0001** −0.0001 0.0001
Unmarried person dummy −0.0994 0.0263*** 0.1231 0.0428***
Enterprise dummiesd
Public sector −0.1844 0.0266*** 0.0760 0.0393*
Private, with <10 employees −0.2751 0.0338*** 0.0543 0.0526
Private, with 10–25 employees −0.0313 0.0423 −0.0254 0.0681
Pension fund registration dummy 0.1172 0.0240*** 0.0335 0.0375
Industry dummiese
Manufacturing 0.0954 0.0315*** 0.0614 0.0656
Electricity, gas, water supply 0.4430 0.0420*** −0.1224 0.0958
Construction 0.1463 0.0368*** −0.0747 0.0928
Wholesale and retail trade 0.1185 0.0403*** 0.1432 0.0758*
Hotels and restaurants 0.1152 0.0575** 0.3167 0.0970***
Transport and communications 0.1716 0.0396*** 0.2101 0.0912**
Financial intermediation 0.6345 0.0842*** −0.0023 0.1150
Real estate and business services 0.0771 0.0540 0.2313 0.1025**
Public administration 0.2801 0.0425*** −0.0613 0.0798
Education 0.0927 0.0478* 0.0857 0.0810
Health and social work 0.1867 0.0506*** 0.0355 0.0808
Other services 0.2361 0.0412*** 0.0747 0.0806
Occupation dummiesf
Managers and senior officials 0.2866 0.0490*** −0.0633 0.0947
Professionals 0.1892 0.0446*** 0.1051 0.0697
Technicians and associate
professionals
0.1716 0.0376*** 0.1094 0.0618*
Clerks 0.1043 0.0391*** 0.0968 0.0623
Service and sales workers 0.0629 0.0345* −0.0430 0.0566
Craft and related trade workers 0.0971 0.0326*** −0.0866 0.0582
Plant and machine operators and
assemblers
0.0628 0.0336* −0.0784 0.0672
Occupation feminization dummiesg
Feminization 21-40 percent −0.0580 0.0234** 0.0003 0.0568
Feminization 41-60 percent −0.0572 0.0256** −0.0060 0.0558
Feminization 61-80 percent −0.1826 0.0402*** 0.0740 0.0659
Feminization >80 percent −0.2275 0.0455*** 0.1269 0.0675*
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Table 6 Macedonia: Wage equation for pooled sample with intercept and slope dummies
for womena (Continued)
Ethnic affiliation dummiesh
Ethnic Albanians −0.0586 0.0364 −0.0564 0.0662
Other minorities −0.0402 0.0338 0.0141 0.0561
Region dummiesi
West Macedonia −0.1020 0.0232*** 0.0240 0.0374
East Macedonia −0.2383 0.0206*** 0.0673 0.0321**
Central Macedonia −0.1413 0.0219*** 0.0255 0.0332
Urban area dummy 0.0273 0.0193 0.0617 0.0309**





aThe dependent variable is logarithm of hourly earnings. Wage equation corrected for sample selection.
bStandard error corrected for heteroscedasticity induced by the selection.
cThe omitted category is below primary education.
dThe omitted category is private enterprises with more than 25 workers.
eThe omitted category is agriculture.
fThe omitted category is elementary (unskilled) occupations.
gThe omitted category is feminization of 20 percent or less.
hThe omitted category is ethnic Macedonian.
iThe omitted category is Skopje region.
***significant at the 1 percent level; **significant at the 5 percent level; *significant at the 10 percent level.
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minorities is mainly in terms of access to wage employment rather than wage offers.
Employees of both sexes in government and public sector establishments and in small
private enterprises earn less than those working in private enterprises with more than
10 workers. Though, the wage gaps between the three groups of enterprises are smaller for
women compared with those for men. From the wages perspective, a workforce of 10 or
more workers seems to be a relevant dividing line for separating small and large private
sector establishments in Macedonia: the coefficient on the dummy variable representing
employment in private establishments with 10 to 25 workers is not statistically significant.
Higher wages in the large private enterprises likely reflect the influence of labor unions, the
desire of employers to minimize labor turnover, and operation of internal labor markets.
Whereas, lower wages in government and public sector establishments relative to the large
private enterprises are mainly a manifestation of the government’s restrictive wages policy.
The regression results indicate that it is important to make a distinction between workers
who are registered with the pension fund and those who are not. Workers not registered
with the pension fund are typically not protected by employment legislation and are likely
to have less job security. Employers not only avoid payment of payroll taxes for unregistered
workers but also reward them less than registered workers. Being registered with the pen-
sion fund increases hourly earnings by 12.7 percent for men and 16.3 percent for women.
There is considerable regional variation in hourly earnings for both sexes, though inter-
regional inequality in earnings is lower for women than for men. Additionally, urban loca-
tion adds significantly to earnings for women but not for men. The regional differences in
hourly earnings may be related to spatial price variations and to differences in productivity.
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women, it cannot be claimed that the urban premium reflects cost-of-living differences
between urban and rural areas. It perhaps suggests that typical “higher-paid” female jobs are
more concentrated in urban centers compared to male jobs, or that men are more likely
than women to commute from rural areas to their work in urban centers.
Occupation and industry affiliation have a significant impact on hourly earnings of both
women and men, with the impact favoring women in many instances. Systematic earnings
differences between occupations and industry likely reflect skill variations or compensating
wage differentials resulting from differences in job characteristics, but may also be due to
institutional factors. The gender-specific regressions show that the coefficients are signifi-
cant on all the occupation dummy variables for men but on only white collar occupations
for women. However, the equation for the pooled sample with slope and intercept dummies
indicates that none of the coefficients on the occupation dummies are significantly different
between men and women, except for that on technicians and associate professionals which
is higher for women. The coefficients for nearly all the industry dummies are significant for
both sexes. The coefficients on the dummies for trade, transport, hotel, and real estate are
higher for women than for men. For the other industry groups, the differences between the
coefficients for men and women are not statistically significant.
Occupation feminization (i.e., proportion of women in the employee’s occupation at the
three-digit level) is entered in the earnings equation as a set of four dummy variables to
allow for a non-linear relationship. The feminization of occupation lowers earnings for both
men and women, and the penalty is greater for men at higher degrees of feminization. In
occupations with more than 80 percent feminization, wages are 20.3 percent lower for men
and 9.5 percent lower for women compared with the base category (occupations with less
than 20 percent feminization). Up to feminization of 80 percent, the differences between
the coefficients on the feminization dummies for men and women are not statistically
significant, signaling that the wage-feminization relationship is similar for both sexes.
However, once feminization exceeds 80 percent, men experience a further drop in wages
but women do not. For women, the coefficients on the dummy variables for feminization of
60–80 percent and more than 80 percent are similar in size.
The crowding hypothesis can explain the negative wage-feminization relationship for
women but not for men. Common explanations for the negative effect of feminization on
men’s wages are that men engaged in predominantly female jobs are of lower quality or that
they have a taste for these jobs and choose to accept lower wages. Macpherson and Hirsch
(1995) have argued that feminization serves as a proxy for unmeasured skills, preferences,
and job attributes. In their study on the United States, they found that in the presence of de-
tailed controls for job characteristics the direct effect of feminization on wages becomes
substantially smaller for both sexes and the stronger negative relationship for men disap-
pears. However, we cannot assert unambiguously that this is the case in Macedonia. In the
present study, occupation feminization has a significant direct effect on wages even after
controlling for occupation and industry. In addition, the coefficients on feminization dum-
mies become less negative by small amounts (between 0 and 0.03 log points) for men but,
contrary to expectations, become more negative for women when occupation and industry
are added to the regression equation. However, it cannot be ruled out that the estimated
effect of feminization would be reduced if specific measures of occupation and industry
characteristics (such as on-the-job training, indices of physical demands, work environment,
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change and low occupational mobility since Macedonia’s independence, one can speculate
that occupational feminization is attributable to institutional factors under the former
socialist Yugoslavia. As European Commission (2010b, p. 18) notes, in Macedonia
“Discriminatory customs, traditions and stereotypes are widespread and undermine
women’s basic rights.” The nature of the data set does not allow us to examine in more
detail competing hypotheses behind occupation feminization.
Selectivity bias is important for both men and women, but the bias is larger for men. For
both sexes, the selectivity term is positive and significant, indicating that wage employees
are positively selected in terms of their unmeasured characteristics, which consequently
result in higher earnings. The finding of a higher positive sample selection bias for men
seems to suggest that men are more likely than women to accept jobs with wages in the
upper segment of their wage offer distribution. This perhaps partly explains the high inci-
dence of unemployment among men. It may also be influenced by the fact that a higher
proportion of men than women were in paid self-employment.
The common perception that sample selection bias is an issue only for women or that it is
greater for women than for men is not universally valid. In their study on Poland, Adamchik
and Bedi (2003) also obtained a positive and significant selectivity term for both men and
women, and the selectivity term was higher for men in three of the five years under study. In
Ashraf and Ashraf ’s (1993) study on Pakistan, the selectivity term was positive and significant
for men but insignificant for women. For Georgia, Khitarishvili (2009) found no evidence of
selection bias among women and, like in most studies on the former Soviet Republics,
obtained a counterintuitive finding of a negative and significant selection term for men.6 Decomposition of observed earnings differentials
Having estimated the earnings equations, we decompose the observed hourly earnings gap
between men and women into three components: (i) that due to differences in selectivity bias;
(ii) that due to gender differences in characteristics (“explained” difference); and (iii) that due
to gender differences in the coefficients of the earnings equations (“unexplained” difference),
caused by unobserved factors, including any discrimination. We also calculate how much of
the “explained” difference can be ascribed to specific sets of characteristics. We do not under-
take similar breakdown for the “unexplained” difference because, as Oaxaca and Ransom
(1999) have shown, the separate contributions of sets of dummy variables to the “unexplained”
difference are not invariant with respect to the choice of the left-out reference groups.
Following the standard practice, the decomposition is based on three alternative assump-
tions: first, that the earnings function for men also applies to women; second, that the
earnings function for women also applies to men; and third, that a weighted average of the
separately estimated wage structures for men and women represents the non-discriminatory
wage structure. The decomposition predicated on the earnings function for men and women
provide the upper and lower bounds of the estimates. A non-discriminatory wage structure
should lie somewhere in between. In this paper, following Cotton (1988), we have used the
proportion of men and women in wage employment as weights for calculating the non-
discriminatory wage structure.
The results of the decomposition exercise are shown in Table 7. We focus on the decom-
position based on the weighted wage structure (column 3). About 28 percent of the








Total observed log hourly earnings gap 0.1173 0.1173 0.1173
Difference due to selectivity bias 0.0333 0.0333 0.0333
Explained difference due to: 0.0213 −0.0768 −0.0171
Education −0.0387 −0.0386 −0.0386
Experience −0.0041 −0.0004 −0.0027
Unmarried person −0.0042 0.0013 −0.0020
Ethnic affiliation −0.0069 −0.0145 −0.0099
Enterprise type −0.0082 −0.0040 −0.0065
Pension fund registration 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Industry 0.0020 −0.0111 −0.0031
Occupation −0.0104 −0.0437 −0.0235
Feminization of occupation 0.0967 0.0492 0.0781
Region −0.0021 −0.0012 −0.0017
Urban −0.0029 −0.0138 −0.0072
Unexplained differenceb 0.0627 0.1608 0.1011
aA positive number means earnings difference in favor of men.
bTotal unexplained difference is the sum of the components attributable to the constant term and the coefficients.
Also equal to total earnings gap minus explained difference minus difference due to selectivity bias.
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the net impact of the selectivity correction. Thus, in the absence of the selection correc-
tion term the observed earnings gap overstates the true offer wage differential. The contri-
bution of the “unexplained” difference (due to difference in coefficients) to the observed
gender earnings gap is substantial―86 percent of the observed earnings gap (0.1011 out
of 0.1173 log points) is “unexplained”7. The “explained” difference is negative. That is,
men would actually earn less than women by 0.0171 log points on the basis of the given
differences in characteristics.
Although it is methodologically inappropriate in the presence of dummy variables to quan-
tify the share of a specific set of coefficients in the total “unexplained” difference, it still seems
that the major source of the “unexplained” wage gap is unobserved sex-related factors that
determine earnings and alter the constant term in the wage equation. This is because, as
already discussed above, the coefficients on the women-specific slope dummies in the wage
equation with slope and intercept dummies show women to be at an advantage or, at least,
not at a disadvantage vis-à-vis men. The constant term is lower for women than for men.
Most of the “explained” difference in the earnings gap can be attributed to gender
differences in education, occupation, and occupation feminization. Women were in a rather
disadvantaged position by virtue of having a higher proportion than men being employed in
female-dominated occupations. In the decomposition based on the weighted wage structure,
occupation feminization explains about 0.0769 log points of the observed gender earnings
gap; i.e., about 65 percent of the observed earnings gap. However, this effect is mostly offset
by women’s advantage in educational and occupational attainment. Women’s advantage in
educational attainment results in an earnings differential of 0.0398 log points in favor of
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occupations contributes to an earnings differential of 0.0233 log points in their favor.7 Multinomial logit estimation of occupational attainment
The gender differences in occupational distribution can arise on account of several factors:
differences in human capital characteristics, differences in “tastes” (e.g., in attitudes and as-
pirations), and prejudices of employers in hiring. We examine the role of these unexplained
factors in occupational attainment in two ways. First, we estimate a model of occupational
attainment for the sample of wage earners as a whole, using the method of multinomial
logit. The explanatory variables include education, age, ethnic affiliation, family structure
(represented by a set of two dummy variables identifying married persons with children up
to five years in age and married persons with children in the age group 6 to 14 years), a
dummy variable for head of household, and a female dummy. The coefficients on the
female dummy indicate the importance of its direct influence (including differences in tastes
and hiring practices) on a particular occupational outcome, controlling for the influences of
the other explanatory variables. They also allow us to gauge the relative effects of gender on
being engaged in different occupations. Second, we estimate a separate model of occupa-
tional attainment for men and then predict the occupational distribution of women assum-
ing that it is determined in the same way as that of men. On this basis, the difference
between the actual occupational distributions of women and men can be decomposed into
difference that is “explained” by differences in characteristics and a residual “unexplained”
difference that can be attributed to omitted factors, differences in taste, and employer
prejudices.
In the multinomial logit model, if there are N occupation groups, the probability that an
individual i characterized by the vector xi ¼ 1; xi2;…;xih
 
of the independent variables will
be found in the jth occupation group is given by
Pij ¼ exp β
0
jx




where βk is the vector of h coefficients corresponding to the kth occupation group. The total
number of parameters to be estimated is h(N − 1), since coefficients for each element of x
are determined only up to an arbitrary normalization. In our model, we set the coefficients
for elementary (unskilled) workers to zero for the purpose of normalization. Thus, the esti-
mated coefficients for each occupation group do not represent marginal probabilities, but
indicate the change in the log of odds of being in that occupation instead of in unskilled oc-
cupations. By ranking the coefficients of a given variable by size, we can see the relative im-
pact of that variable on the probabilities of being in specific occupations.
The estimates of the multinomial logit model indicate that there is differential access to
occupations according to gender (see upper panel of Table 8). The coefficient on the female
dummy is significantly different from zero in five occupation groups and the sign varies
across occupations. Ceteris paribus, the likelihood of being a manager or plant and machine
operator is lower (the coefficient on the female dummy is negative and significant) and the
likelihood of being a professional, technician and associate professional or a clerical worker
is higher (the coefficient on the female dummy is positive and significant) for women com-
pared to men. There is no significant difference between men and women in the likelihood
of being engaged as service and sales workers or being in craft and related trade.
Table 8 Macedonia: Coefficients and asymptotic standard errors for the multinomial















Constant −21.1246 −20.8515 −11.2797 −9.9732 −1.1533 −1.7064 −3.6846
(1.9546)*** (1.2275)*** (0.9526)*** (0.9362)*** (0.6828)* (0.6660)** (0.8171)***
Education, in years 1.3177 1.6071 0.9571 0.7317 0.3465 0.1757 0.2689
(0.0526)*** (0.0437)*** (0.0373)*** (0.0344)*** (0.0248)*** (0.0204)*** (0.0250)***
Age 0.1132 −0.0472 −0.0298 0.0397 −0.1076 0.0382 0.0661
(0.0866) (0.0565) (0.0457) (0.0451) (0.0347)*** (0.0337) (0.0412)
Age-squared −0.0002 0.0014 0.0009 0.0002 0.0013 −0.0005 −0.0007
(0.0010) (0.0007)** (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0004)*** (0.0004) (0.0005)
Ethnic affiliation
dummiesa
Albanian −0.2327 1.3643 −0.0988 0.2048 0.1619 −0.2814 −0.8034
(0.4821) (0.2936)*** (0.2983) (0.2720) (0.2022) (0.1899) (0.2393)***
Other minorities 0.5125 0.3807 −0.1400 −0.0777 −0.0568 −0.3334 −0.1627





0.4598 0.5224 0.3574 0.2481 0.3012 0.3683 0.4530
(0.2566)* (0.1959)*** (0.1683)** (0.1689) (0.1431)** (0.1342)*** (0.1497)***
Married with child
of 6–14 years
0.3711 0.0026 0.0379 −0.1324 0.1584 0.2109 0.1121
(0.2140)* (0.1694) (0.1455) (0.1435) (0.1252) (0.1152)* (0.1321)
Head of household
dummy
0.1207 0.1021 0.2075 −0.0131 0.1227 0.2188 0.1592
(0.2616) (0.2165) (0.1851) (0.1835) (0.1608) (0.1483) (0.1635)
Female dummy −0.5787 0.8703 0.3625 0.5412 0.0692 −0.1457 −1.5635
(0.2611)** (0.1920)*** (0.1634)** (0.1612)*** (0.1408) (0.1339) (0.1713)***
Log likelihood = −8770.197; Chi-squared = 4012.852; N = 5436; d.f. = 63.
B. Men
Constant −20.5173 −19.9835 −11.6217 −9.7774 −1.8815 −3.4966 −4.9669
(2.2980)*** (1.6425)*** (1.2704)*** (1.2676)*** (0.8894)** (0.8646)*** (0.9612)***
Education, in years 1.1404 1.4393 0.8962 0.5751 0.3390 0.1699 0.2437
(0.0589)*** (0.0544)*** (0.0458)*** (0.0426)*** (0.0311)*** (0.0248)*** (0.0279)***
Age 0.1896 0.0239 0.0155 0.1346 −0.0700 0.1171 0.1391
(0.1015)* (0.0753) (0.0615) (0.0622)** (0.0464) (0.0443)*** (0.0490)***
Age-squared −0.0010 0.0007 0.0005 −0.0009 0.0010 −0.0011 −0.0014
(0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0006)* (0.0005)** (0.0006)**
Ethnic affiliation
dummiesa
Albanian −0.5827 1.0844 −0.6520 0.1014 0.1401 −0.1685 −0.7920
(0.5230) (0.3259)*** (0.3636)* (0.2936) (0.2177) (0.2012) (0.2458)***
Other minorities 0.1717 0.1772 −0.4237 −0.2166 −0.2220 −0.1423 −0.2601
(0.4547) (0.4238) (0.3664) (0.3440) (0.2719) (0.2360) (0.2571)
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Table 8 Macedonia: Coefficients and asymptotic standard errors for the multinomial





0.5094 0.3824 0.4541 0.0917 0.2716 0.3829 0.4372
(0.2884)* (0.2491) (0.2079)** (0.2167) (0.1747) (0.1614)** (0.1709)**
Married with child
of 6–14 years
0.1438 −0.1916 0.0017 −0.3954 −0.0152 −0.1287 −0.1219
(0.2536) (0.2277) (0.1930) (0.1956)** (0.1642) (0.1480) (0.1574)
Head of household
dummy
−0.1376 −0.1910 −0.0534 −0.3189 −0.0136 −0.0238 −0.0423
(0.2905) (0.2598) (0.2222) (0.2212) (0.1922) (0.1753) (0.1847)
Log likelihood = −5504.404; Chi-squared = 1939.604; N = 3305; d.f. = 56.
aThe omitted category is ethnic Macedonian.
bThe omitted category is married persons with no children and unmarried persons.
***Significant at the 1 percent level, using a two-tailed test; **significant at the 5 percent level; *significant at the 10
percent level.
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factors on the occupational distribution, we estimate a separate model of occupational
attainment for men (see lower panel of Table 8). Employing these estimates, we obtain the
predicted distribution for each sex as follows: substitute the sample data for each sex into
the estimated model, producing for each individual a vector of predicted probabilities of
belonging to each of the eight occupation groups, and calculate the mean of the predicted
probabilities for each occupation after summing over observations. For men this estimation
yields a predicted distribution which is identical to their actual sample distribution, i.e.,
Mp =Ma. The difference in the predicted distributions of men and women (Ma–Wp), is the
‘explained’ component due to difference in characteristics, and the residual difference,
(Wp–Wa), is the ‘unexplained’ component due to differences in tastes, hiring prejudices, or
other unobservable factors.
The results of the decomposition exercise are presented in upper panel of Table 9. We
focus mainly on the decompositions for the large differences in the actual sample distribu-
tions. The exercise shows that if there was no differential access to occupation by gender, the
proportion of women engaged as professionals, technicians and associate professionals, and
clerks would be much smaller than observed, and the proportion of women engaged as
managers and plant operators would be considerably higher than observed (column 5). The
residual “unexplained” component accounts for around 73-78 percent of the observed
difference between women and men in the proportions engaged in professional and clerical
occupations, and 97 percent in the case of plant and machine operators (column 7). Given
the nature of these occupations, this likely reflects “supply-side” differences in preferences of
women for white-collar jobs. For managers and senior officials, the residual “unexplained”
difference (0.0269) is actually greater than the observed difference (0.0198). If there was no
differential access to occupation by gender, the proportion in managerial positions would
be higher for women than for men. It is difficult to ascribe this finding to “supply-side”
difference in tastes.8 Within-occupation earnings functions and decomposition of earnings
differentials
Brown et al. (1980) suggest the following decomposition of the wage gap: a part which is
due to wage differences within occupations and another part which is due to differences
Table 9 Macedonia: Actual and predicted occupational distribution according to sex












Men Women Men Women
Ma Wa Mp Wp Ma–Wa Ma–Wp Wp–Wa
Occupation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) = (1) – (2) (6) = (1) – (4) (7) = (4) – (2)
Managers and
senior officials
0.0390 0.0192 0.0390 0.0462 0.0198 −0.0072 0.0269




0.0953 0.1319 0.0953 0.1086 −0.0366 −0.0133 −0.0232
Clerks 0.0817 0.1502 0.0817 0.0974 −0.0685 −0.0157 −0.0527
Service and
sales workers
0.1628 0.1755 0.1628 0.1528 −0.0127 0.0100 −0.0227
Craft and related
trade workers








0.1026 0.1051 0.1026 0.0849 −0.0025 0.0177 −0.0203
Observed
wage gap




Men Women Explained Unexplained
Ln Ym Ln Yw Ln Ym – Ln Yw (Ma – Wp) x Ln Ym (Wp – Wa) x Ln Ym
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Managers and
senior officials
4.2994 4.0965 0.2029 −0.0308 0.1158




4.0715 3.9846 0.0869 −0.0542 −0.0946
Clerks 3.9127 3.9334 −0.0206 −0.0616 −0.2063
Service and sales
workers
3.8152 3.6057 0.2095 0.0380 −0.0865
Craft and related
trade workers








3.5462 3.3817 0.1645 0.0628 −0.0718
All 8.9923 8.8567 0.1356 −0.0221 −0.0164
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j; Wpj is the predicted proportion of women in occupation j assuming men’s occupational
outcomes; XMJ and XWJ are the mean values of the characteristics of men and women,
respectively, in occupation j; βMJ and βWJ are the estimated wage equation coefficients for
men and women, respectively, for occupation j. The first term on the right hand side of
the equation is the “explained” component of the wage differences within occupations,
the second term is the “unexplained” component of the wage differences within occupa-
tions, the third term is the “explained” component of the wage gap due to differences in
occupational distribution, and the fourth term is the “unexplained” component of the
wage gap due to differences in occupational distribution. If the within-earnings function is
estimated with selection correction, then an additional term can be introduced in the
above expression to measure the wage gap due to selectivity bias.
The estimates for the “explained” and “unexplained” components of the wage gap due to
differences in occupational distribution are shown in the bottom panel of Table 9. In the
aggregate, both the components favor women and make a combined negative contribution
of 0.0385 log points to the observed wage gap. This is consistent with the findings of the
simple decomposition exercise presented earlier in Table 7. The “unexplained” component
is large and positive for managers and plant and machine operators, but is more than
offset by the negative effect for the other occupation groups.
Although the decomposition exercise suggests that the observed gender wage gap in
Macedonia mainly reflects earnings differences within occupations, it would be misleading
to conclude that occupational segregation does not play a significant role. This is because
there is job segregation within the broad occupational groups and it has a significant
influence on the wage gap.
Occupation-specific earnings functions show that occupation feminization “explains”
quite a high proportion of the observed wage gap for craft and related trade workers (82
percent), technicians and associate professionals (49 percent), service and sales workers (48
percent), and professionals (19 percent) (see Table 10). The total contribution of the
“explained” component to the observed wage gap for these four occupation groups varies
between 55 percent and 75 percent, based on the weighted wage structure. Occupation
feminization is not important for unskilled workers and, unlike in other occupation groups,
works toward reducing the observed wage gap for clerical workers. Significantly, for both
clerical and unskilled occupations, the “explained” part of the within-occupation wage gap
is negative; that is, men would earn less than women on the basis of the given differences in
characteristics.
The decomposition exercise shows that the earnings difference due to selectivity bias is
large for all occupation groups, except for unskilled occupations. The net impact of selectiv-
ity is negative for professionals and for technical and associate professionals, and positive
for the other occupation groups. However, the “unexplained” component due to differences
in the coefficients of the earnings function is also large and works in the opposite direction
to that of selectivity bias. Still, the net residual effect accounts for a sizeable part of the
observed wage gap. These findings suggest complex factors at work and are difficult to
explain.
We did not estimate separate gender-specific earnings functions for managers and for
plant and machine operators, because the number of women in these two occupation
groups was too small for meaningful analysis. Hence we could not calculate the aggregate
Table 10 Macedonia: Decomposition of gender differences in hourly earnings by occupationa




























Total observed log hourly earnings gap 0.0857 0.0857 0.0857 0.0869 0.0869 0.0869 −0.0206 −0.0206 −0.0206
Difference due to selectivity bias −0.1724 −0.1724 −0.1724 −0.5751 −0.5751 −0.5751 0.1616 0.1616 0.1616
Explained difference due to: 0.0125 0.0776 0.0476 0.0736 0.0487 0.0619 −0.0441 −0.1282 −0.0898
Feminization of occupation −0.0091 0.0376 0.0161 0.0573 0.0261 0.0426 0.0091 −0.0705 −0.0341
Unexplained differenceb 0.2457 0.1805 0.2105 0.5884 0.6133 0.6001 −0.1381 −0.0540 −0.0925




























Total observed log hourly earnings gap 0.2095 0.2095 0.2095 0.2993 0.2993 0.2993 0.1645 0.1645 0.1645
Difference due to selectivity bias 0.2817 0.2817 0.2817 0.6062 0.6062 0.6062 −0.0312 −0.0312 −0.0312
Explained difference due to: 0.1243 0.0975 0.1133 0.2082 0.2500 0.2231 −0.0924 −0.1525 −0.1163
Feminization of occupation 0.1002 0.1024 0.1011 0.2324 0.2732 0.2469 0.0124 0.0052 0.0095
Unexplained differenceb −0.1966 −0.1697 −0.1855 −0.5151 −0.5568 −0.5299 0.2881 0.3482 0.3120
aA positive number means earnings difference in favor of men.
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wage differences, in line with the methodology of Brown et al. (1980). However, when wage
equations are estimated for all managers and for all plant and machine operators with a
dummy variable for women included in the list of independent variables, the coefficient on
women is negative and significant: ceteris paribus, women in managerial jobs or working as
plant and machine operators have between 30 percent and 33 percent lower hourly earnings
than men (see Appendix, Additional file 1: Table S1).9 Conclusions
This paper on gender differentials in earnings in Macedonia in 2000 has four principal find-
ings. First, the lower earnings of women in Macedonia cannot be explained by gender differ-
ences in measured human capital endowments. The average educational attainment of
women was above that of men. Furthermore, women were at an advantage vis-à-vis men
with regard to the marginal return to education. This suggests that for promoting gender
equality in earnings the focus should not be on expansion of education of women.
Second, there was differential access to occupation by gender. A higher proportion of
women than men worked in white-collar occupations such as professionals, technicians and
associate professionals, and clerks. Whereas, men had a higher proportion working as
managers and as plant and machine operators. Differences in endowments explained only a
small part of the observed difference in the occupational distribution. The bulk of the differ-
ence was attributable to “unexplained” factors. Significantly, if there was no differential
access to occupation by gender, the proportion in managerial positions would be higher for
women than for men. It is difficult to ascribe this finding to “supply-side” difference in
tastes. Still, the aggregate impact of the differences in occupational distribution on earnings
favored women and worked towards lowering the observed gender earnings gap.
Third, the occupational distribution measured at the one-digit ISCO classification level
hides the high degree of employment segregation by sex that exists at more disaggregated
levels of occupational classification. The degree of concentration in a limited number of
occupations at the ISCO-88 three-digit level was much higher among women than among
men, and women were over-represented in female-dominated occupations. Feminization of
occupations had a sizeable negative effect on the earnings of women, but the negative effect
was stronger for men at higher degrees of feminization. Occupation feminization accounted
for a sizeable part of the overall gender wage gap as well as the one-digit level occupation-
specific wage gaps. It is possible that cultural factors conditioned by the pre-Yugoslavia
legacy were mainly responsible for stereotyping of women and their streamlining into low-
paying jobs and for the persistence of discriminatory pay practices. In countries with a long
tradition of desegregation policies (such as Denmark, Finland, Germany, and Sweden), an
important element of equal opportunities policies has been to encourage young girls to con-
sider a wider range of occupational options. Such efforts in Macedonia may help to change
perceptions regarding appropriate female activities and reduce occupational segregation.
Comparable worth policies are also a way to address the problem of undervaluation of
female-dominated occupations. However, as Altonji and Blank (1999, p. 3248) note, there is
considerable debate over the advantages and disadvantages of comparable worth policies. In
particular, no matter how occupational categories and occupational characteristics are
measured, it is hard to resolve without firm-level data whether important unobserved
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(2011) points out, Macedonia will need to address the problems with the implementation
and enforcement of the law on equal opportunities arising from weaknesses in the adminis-
trative machinery and poor gender data gathering and reporting.
Fourth, the role of “unexplained” factors in accounting for the observed differentials in
earnings and occupational composition was substantial. The evidence suggests that complex
factors were at work. It cannot be ruled out that some of the “unexplained” component of
the gender pay gap represented legitimate compensating differentials for worker skills or
job attributes not captured in this paper.
In Macedonia, in common with many other countries in eastern Europe, there has been
little policy debate and strategy on the gender pay gap issue. In large part, this is because of
low awareness and absence of feminism (European Commission 2009, p. 56). To address
this problem in member states and candidate countries, a major thrust of the EU’s “Equality
Pays Off” initiative is to raise awareness of the gender pay gap among government organiza-
tions, trade unions, employers’ organization, and the population at large (European
Commission 2011). Subsequent empirical research on gender earnings differentials will
demonstrate the effectiveness of this initiative across countries.
Endnotes
1Much of this literature is reviewed in Altonji and Blank (1999), European Commission
(2003) (2006), (2009), (2010a), Newell and Reilley (2000), UNICEF (1999), and World Bank
(2002).
2See http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=earn_gr_hgpg&lang=en
3For background, see http://www.msc.es/ssi/igualdadOportunidades/iEmpleo/Igualdad_
salarial/Proyecto_Equality_Pays_Off_ingles.pdf .




5See Lehmann (2010), Table III.5, page 21. Lehmann interprets this finding as evidence
of lack of enforcement of labor regulations.
6The relative effect of a dummy variable on earnings in a semi-logarithmic specification
is given by 100*{exp (d) ‒ 1}, where d is the coefficient on the dummy variable.
7Angel-Urdinola (2008) also obtained similar very large “unexplained” component in
his study on Macedonia.
Appendix
This appendix provides the results on the occupation-specific earnings functions for
both sexes together and separately for men and women (Additional file 1: Table S1).
Additional file
: Table S1. Macedonia. Coefficient and standard errors of with-in occupation earnings functions
with selectivity correctiona.
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